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19661 NEW YORK PRACTICE COVERAGE 127
absence.9 Therefore, this toll, according to Texas law, had no
application to the defendant-owner since he was never physically
present within Texas to initiate the toll's applicability. In contrast,
prior New York cases indicate that where the non-domiciliary
defendant is outside the State at the accrual of a cause of action,
the statute will be tolled until he comes into the State.10 ' The
result will be the same under the CPLR." However, the court,
utilizing the shorter Texas statute of limitations, dismissed the
action against the owner.
The effect of the Texas statute of limitations on the driver,
who, obviously, was present within Texas when the cause of action
accrued, was not so simply determined. In New York, such a
non-resident's absence would not toll the statute of limitations,
since in personam jurisdiction could be obtained either through
the application of CPLR 302(a) (2) (commission of a tortious act
within the state) or by the non-resident motorist statute.-2 This
result is mandated by CPLR 207 which acts as a limiting force on
CPLR 202, dictating that, if personal jurisdiction can be obtained,
no toll applies, even where the defendant is absent from the state.'3
Although there are few cases on this point, it appears that the
Texas rule is to the contrary.' 4 Therefore, the court refused to
dismiss the action against the driver notwithstanding the availability
of a non-resident motorist statute which subjected the defendant
to in personam jurisdiction even during his absence from the state.
Since both New York and Texas would find the action-against
the driver timely commenced, it was unnecessary to determine
which statute of limitations applied. It would appear, however,
that CPLR 202 would mandate the application of the New York
statute of limitations if three years had expired from the accrual
of the cause of action since the Texas statute would have been
tolled for the duration of defendant's absence from the state.
CPLR 204(a).: Statute of limitations no bar where stipulation with
municipality forced plaintiff to delay commencement of action.
In Robinson v,. City of New York,' 5 the plaintiff, after filing a
timely claim, stipulated with defendant to stay commencement of
OWise v. Anderson, 163 Tex. 608, 359 S.W2d 876 (1962; Simonds v.
Stanolind Oil & Gas. Co., 134 Tex. 332, 114 S.W2d 226 (1938).
10 Ackerman v. Ackerman, 200 N.Y. 72, 93 N.E. 192 (1910) ; In the Matter
of Estate of Morris, 45 Misc. 2d 393, 395, 256 N.Y.S.2d 872, 874 (Surr. Ct.
Nassau County 1965).
"1 SEco REP. 57.2 N.Y. VmHiCLE & TpAmc LAW § 253.
13 7B McKnmnys CPLR 207, commentary 181-82 (1963); SEcOND RM.
57.
14 See, e.g., Simonds v. Stanolind Oil & Gas. Co., supra note 9, at 343,
114 S.W.2d at 233.
15 24 App. Div. 2d 260, 265 N.Y.S2d 566 (Ist Dep't 1965).
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the action until an examination of plaintiff was completed. Subse-
quently, the city informed plaintiff that it did not intend to complete
the examination since the one year and ninety-day statute of
limitations 16 had expired. Thereupon, plaintiff commenced this
action.
At the outset, it must be recognized that a stipulation providing
for a stay of the suit does not automatically toll the running of
the statute of limitations.17  Furthermore, CPLR 204(a), which
tolls the statute of limitations for the duration of a statutory pro-
hibition or court imposed stay, is not applicable since a stipulation
between parties does not fall into either category. s In fact, such a
stipulation is usually not made with any intent to avoid the applicable
statute of limitations. The obligation rests on the plaintiff to
commence the action after the expiration of the stipulation and
prior to the running of the statute of limitations.'"
In the instant case, the court utilized the doctrine of equitable
estoppel to avoid the application of the statute of limitations as a
bar to plaintiff's cause of action. There is authority for this
holding in Section 17.103 of the General Obligations Law, which
vests in the court power to refuse enforcement of the statute of
limitations whenever there is a stipulation in writing signed by
the party seeking to assert the defense of the statute of limitations.20
The court also stressed the fact that commencement of the suit
prior to the expiration of the stipulation would have been a breach
of that agreement. Furthermore, it appears that an action brought
prior to that time would have been subject to dismissal as pre-
mature.21
If balancing of equities has any part in such a decision, there
is no doubt that plaintiff's case is stronger, especially in light of
the city's dilatory tactics, seemingly aimed at one result, viz., avoid-
ing the hearing of the merits of the case. However, a strong
dissent in Robinson stressed both the statutory provision divesting
16 N.Y. GEN. MUNIc. LAW § 50-i(1).
17 Woodcrest Constr. Co. v. City of New York, 185 Misc. 18, 57 N.Y.S,2d
498 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1945), aff'd, 273 App. Div. 752, 75 N.Y.S.2d 299
(1st Dep't 1947).
18 Barchet v. New York City Transit Authority, 24 App. Div. 2d 963,265
N.Y:S.2d 494 (1st Dep't 1965); Blake v. New York City Housing Authority,
36 Misc. 2d 914, 234 N.Y.S.2d 253 (Sup. Ct. Queens County 1962).
19 See 509 Sixth Ave. Corp. v. New York City Transit Authority, 24 App.
Div. 2d 975, 265 N.Y.S.2d 429 (1st Dep't 1965); Augstein v. Levey, 3 App.
Div. 2d 595, 598, 162 N.Y.S.2d 269, 272 (1st Dep't 1957), aff'd, 4 N.Y.2d
791, 149 N.E.2d 528, 173 N.Y.S.2d 27 (1958).
20 23A McKIxNmz's GEx. OBLIGATiONS LAW § 17-103, commentary 637-38
(1963); see 1 WEINsTEiN, Koxx & MILLEa Nv Yoax Civix PRAcnca
201.13 (1965).
a Rapp v. City of New York, 176 App. Div. 155, 162 N.Y. Supp. 300 (2d
Dep't 1916). •
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the city of power to waive the defense of statute of limitations by
any act, and the finality placed by the legislature on all time
provisions relevant to suits against municipalities. Although this
decision is authority for the exercise of equitable estoppel against a
municipality's defense of the statute of limitations, reliance upon
this case should be coupled with a degree of caution since a slight
variation in the facts might demand the application of the rules
as espoused by the dissent.
ARTICLE 3 - JURISDICTIoN AND SEavIcE, APPEARANCE AND
CHOICE OF COURT
CPLR 302(a)(2).: Applicable where defendant is New York
doniciliary when cause of action arises, but is non-domiciliary
at time the action is commenced.
In Massik v. Zimmerman,22 the supreme court, Erie County,
held that a "gap" exists in CPLR 302, which permits a person
who was a domiciliary at the time the cause of action accrued to
escape the court's jurisdiction by changing his domicile prior to
the commencement of the action. Although recognizing that the
result was inconsistent with the legislature's intent to expand
jurisdictional bases, the court reasoned that the "gap" could be
closed only by amendment of the statute.
This view was shared by the supreme court, Broome County,
in State v. Associated Bldg. Contractors of the Triple Cities, Inc.23
The court there held that under CPLR 302 it was necessary that a
person be a non-domiciliary both at the time the cause of action
accrued, and when the summons and complaint were served. How-
ever, upon appeal, the appellate division, third department,2 unan-
imously reversed, holding that the legislature could not have intended
such a "gap."
This decision is consistent with O'Connor v. Wells, 5 wherein
the supreme court, Greene County, rejected the "gap" argument,
and, pursuant to CPLR 104, liberally construed CPLR 302. The
result achieved in Associated and O'Connor seems to be in accordance
with the intention of the legislature. It appears inconsistent that
the courts by virtue of CPLR 302 (a) would acquire jurisdiction
over a non-domiciliary who commits an act within the state, and
22 48 Misc. 2d 217, 264 N.Y.S2d 647 (Sup. Ct. Erie County 1965).
2347 Misc. 2d 699, 263 N.Y.S.2d 74 (Sup. Ct Broome County), revd sub
non., State v. Davies, 24 App. Div. ?d 240, 265 N.Y.S.2d 358 (3d Dep't
1965). See The Biannual Survey of New York Practice, 40 ST. JoHN'S .
REV. 310 (1966).
24 State v. Davies, supra note 23.
25 43 Misc. 2d 1075, 252 N.Y.S.2d 861 (Sup. Ct. Greene County 1964).
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